

Translation

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海事意外調查組

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Marine Accident Investigation Section

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Notes of Interview
會見摘記

File No.: MAI/902/333-2012
檔案編號

Name of Informant/Witness: 報告者/証人姓名	LEUNG Pui-sang	Age: 年齡	[REDACTED]	Sex: 性別	Male
Address: 住址	[REDACTED]	Tel. No.: 電話	[REDACTED]		
Occupation/Rank: 職業/職位	(Deletion) Engineer of "Lamma IV"	Nationality: 國籍	Chinese	Dialect: 方言	Cantonese/ Putonghua
Taken by: 由調查人員	SZETO Yiu-kuen/ Surveyor of Ships	In 以	Chinese	Language 語言錄取	
Time: 時間	0915	Date: 日期	01-11-2012	Place: 地點	Marine Accident Investigation Section, 21/F, Harbour Building, Central

In order to facilitate the investigations into the collision between a Hong Kong and Kowloon Ferry Limited catamaran "Sea Smooth" and a Hongkong Electric Company Limited launch "Lamma IV" which took place off Shek Kok Tsui, Lamma Island at about 2020 hours on 1 October 2012, as well as to avoid similar incidents in future, we are now taking notes of the relevant information from you. This interview is conducted in the attendance of Catherine WONG, Legal Counsel of Hongkong Electric Company Limited and Ronald LEE of Reed Smith Richards Butler. Unless (deletion) ordered by the court, (these notes) will not be released to other departments (insertion) and the public and will not be used for prosecution (deletion) purpose. (deletion)

I, LEUNG Pui-sang, the engineer of "Lamma (deletion) IV", am responsible for engine operation, such as starting the engines, checking the oil, water, water pumps, etc. I have been working in Hongkong Electric Company Limited for over 30 years. I started out as an apprentice in the 1970s and obtained the certificate of competency as engineer in 1994. I started working on "Lamma IV" in early 1996 as a sailor and was promoted to the rank "Engineer" around 10 years later.

Launch "Lamma IV" started plying between Lamma Island and Central to take staff to and from their work places in 1997. I had obtained (deletion) the (local) certificate of competency as master of a vessel of 60 tons (and under) but it was lost. I also have the (local) certificate of competency as engineer of a vessel with engines of (up to) "150 hp". I have not attended any (deletion) radar course, (insertion) but the company had nominated me to attend the survival and fire-fighting courses organised by the Maritime Services Training Institute. However, the certificates had been lost for a long time. Before the incident, my health condition was fair except for a little diarrhoea, (but) I did not go to the toilet during the voyage. My duties (deletion) include opening the lock at the start, entering the engine room, checking the machines, etc., and then informing the coxswain. During a voyage, I will stay in the engine room to check the machines, air-conditioners, etc., and then (deletion) I will go to the bridge to take a look at the instrument (deletion) panel, fill in the engine room logbook and the maintenance logbook, etc. I will also assist with the look-out duties which is my personal habit, as the company has not assigned me to take up the look-out duties. The coxswain will not (deletion) leave his seat during (deletion) a voyage. Moreover, I am short-sighted and possibly presbyopic, but I do not wear glasses.

Interviewer Signature
接見者簽署

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Interviewee Signature
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[continued] I do not wear glasses at work. Before the incident, my working hours were 0800 to 2000 hours on the 29th and 30th days. At 0800, I departed from Lamma Island for Ap Lei Chau. (The voyage) took around 20 minutes. Then at 0900 I departed from Ap Lei Chau for Lamma Island. The voyage took around 20 minutes as well. (deletion) Under normal circumstances, I set off again at 1700. I live in Ma On Shan. I get up for work at 0530 and spend around 15 to 20 minutes on commuting time.

The last overhaul of "Lamma IV" was conducted in around July/August and I was responsible for checking the valves. When maintenance works are required, the company will consult me or conduct the works according to the "maintenance logbook". In general, if minor repairs are required, request will be made to (deletion) the Machine Section. During the last overhaul, I was responsible for checking other works, "lock valve" was not included.

When checking the steering gear room, I will (deletion) enter it at the stern of the launch. It can also be entered by crawling in from the storage compartment (oil tank compartment). I seldom enter the steering gear room because the air needs to be checked before entering. As far as I can remember, there has been an (deletion) access point on the (deletion) wall of the storage compartment since the launch of "Lamma IV". Furthermore, I know there are lead strips inside the steering gear room. According to my experience, (deletion) the rudder cannot maintain a steady course in the water and I am not sure how much time it takes to yaw. I understand that the (deletion) rudder must remain stable. Since the last overhaul, there was something wrong with the steering gear and the launch was sent to Cheoy Lee Shipyards Limited for repair in (deletion) around August/September. Moreover, the propeller was also replaced in around September as it got (insertion) damaged off Lamma Island. If there is any problem with the bridge's navigation equipment, the company will (deletion) seek maintenance from professionals. The company does not provide any inspection guide or check list for operating the launch, but the oil temperature, fuel filling and water (deletion) filling will be recorded (deletion) in the logbook. I did not record anything in the logbook on the day of the incident as I planned to do so after work. Also, there was something wrong with the "piston" of the right main engine about a week prior to the incident and the "piston" was replaced. A remark to be made on the steering gear, attention will be paid to the hydraulic system to see whether there is oil leakage during inspection.

Regarding the voyage (time) of the launch in the incident, I did not look at the watch. I heard from other people that the launch started at around a quarter past the hour. The sailors were responsible for head count and the number was recorded in the navigation logbook which was placed in the bridge. I am not sure about the number of adults and children (deletion) passengers in that voyage. There were about (deletion) 40 people on the lower deck, (insertion) 20 in the front and 20 in the back. There were around 60 people inside the passenger cabin on the upper deck and over 20 people on the open-air upper deck. As far as I can remember, there were four rows of seats on the open-air upper deck. My main concern was on

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[continued] whether (deletion) the launch was overloaded instead of where the passengers sat (homonym) after embarkation, and I only (deletion) told the passengers (deletion) to find a seat. When the incident happened, not many people were walking around on board. I did not think it was a problem that many people stayed on the open-air upper deck as the launch was not overloaded. I do not know whether the coxswain had turned on the radar before setting off. I only know that the navigation lights were on. I am not sure if the radar was functioning properly. As for whether the seats on the upper deck were securely attached to the ground, I would see whether any complaints were received from the passengers. If the seats were too loosely attached, they would be taken away and made unavailable to the passengers. I am not clear about the problem regarding the screws on the seats on the upper deck, I only know that they have always been a little bit loosened. The focus of an overhaul is always placed on major items, such as the fire fighting system, (instead of) the seat problem as many things are put on the seats by the (staff) of the shipyard during an overhaul. I saw the navigation light signal on the pier, but I could not see the left side clearly. I only know (deletion) that there was a navigation light indicator in the bridge and the alarm would (deletion) sound if there was something wrong with the navigation light.

Before the incident, no passengers on board were wearing life jackets and there was no broadcast on the means of emergency escape. There were no children life jackets on board and the life jackets were usually placed under the seats while some others were stowed in the cabinets inside the cabin. No life jackets were placed in the open area on board, but there were around 60 to 70 life buoys, a few of which were placed in the bridge. I know how to use the life rafts (homonym) which were placed at the stern. I received the training over 10 years ago. I heard from the sailors that the life rafts (homonym) should have automatically opened by itself when the incident happened.

On the day of the incident, the weather was normal with mild waves and wind. At first, I was at the stern, the sailors were at the (deletion) bow unknottting the cables and the coxswain was in the bridge. Later, I maintained a look-out at the stern and then checked out the operation of the air-conditioner(s) before returning to the engine room. I had been to the bridge when checking out the operation of the air-conditioner. I saw the coxswain in the bridge and another colleague who was the organiser of the boat trip at the door, and the navigation light signal was on at that time. (Deletion) During the look-out, I saw a (deletion) catamaran which was in the distance of two vessels' length. I had not paid attention to whether the coxswain had accelerated, decelerated or (deletion) yawed. (Deletion) I saw there was a (deletion) catamaran 30 degrees (deletion) to the left in front of me but I did not notice whether its navigation

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[continued] lights, horn, etc. were on. Regarding the lighting of our launch, the lights on the upper deck were off and the lights at the back of the lower deck were on. I do not remember whether the lights in the front of the lower deck were on or off. The collision happened a few seconds after I saw the (deletion) (catamaran). I did not notice whether the two vessels had had any communication. When I was checking in the engine room after the launch had set off, I did not feel that the speed was unusual and it was sailing at around 12 – 13 knots, with the main engine running at a speed of around 1200-1300 revolutions per minute (RPM). The maximum speed of the main engine was 2000 RPM (deletion) and we had tried running the engine at 1600-1700 RPM at the start of the voyage, but the launch vibrated vigorously so we did not run the main engine at that speed. I had not paid attention to the sea state before the voyage. The health condition of the coxswain should be normal. After the collision, the coxswain loudly asked the passengers to put on the life jackets and reminded me not to go to the engine room. There was electric supply at the time of collision. (Deletion) But I went down to the engine room and (deletion) saw that water had already leaked in the room. When I went back to the passenger cabin, (insertion) I saw the doors on both sides of the launch had already been opened. I shouted out loud to the coxswain, "the launch is sinking". After that, (deletion) I saw that there was a catamaran (deletion) on the starboard side aft of our launch, at a distance of two vessels' length. I called for help and then told the passengers to put on the life jackets. But a few people at the back had no response. The ceiling near (deletion) them had collapsed. I have not paid attention to and am not clear what the coxswain and sailors were doing when the accident happened. I am not quite sure whether the coxswain was sitting at the right position before the (deletion) incident. I fell down after the collision but I (insertion) got up and (deletion) went to the engine room immediately. I have no knowledge of other matters, including the situation of the catamaran which collided with our launch and other matters at that time. The water level inside the engine room reached the duckboard. The electricity supply stopped around 2 minutes later. I am not sure whether the seats were still securely attached to the ground on the upper deck when I got out of the bridge. I only saw that some passengers were still sitting (homonym) there. According to my experiences, I think the reason for the seats on the upper deck to be completely detached after the incident is that there was something wrong with the fibre self-tapping screws. I have no comment as to whether the situation would be better if the screws used were the same as the through-bolt screws used on the lower deck.

The company (deletion) has provided guidelines in respect of (deletion) (insertion) emergency training (deletion), such as fire fighting and ship abandonment. I know my duties, namely locking the valves and preparing the release of carbon dioxide etc, which mainly involve work in the engine room. The fuel valves are quick-closing valves located at

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[continued] the vessel's rear end. I do not know that the Marine Department has issued a guideline regarding the fireworks display. Before the journey, the engine compartment door on the right was closed. (I am) not sure (about the door on) the left. The vessel is refuelled about once a week. On the day of the accident, there were about 4000 litres of fuel. The water capacity was about more than half of the tank. There should be no oil in the two slop tanks. Before the journey, I had dinner at about 1730 hours. I did not drink alcohol or take medications. After the collision, I did not pay attention as to whether any injured people were bleeding. I know the coxswain of "Lamma IV". I have seen the coxswain of "Sea Smooth" once. (I) have known the coxswain of "Lamma IV" for more than 20 years but (I) do not work together with the coxswain of "Lamma IV" often. This coxswain's attitude when navigating is all right. (deletion) As far as I know, he (deletion) does not have a drinking habit.

The vessel has all along been handled by 3 crew members, namely a coxswain, an engineer and a sailor. About 10-odd years ago, there used to be 5 people on duty. As for the alteration issue, alteration has been carried out around after 1996, such as the addition of lead bars and the addition of supporting structures in the second compartment etc. I am not sure whether the "opening" next to the storage compartment is original or added. Moreover, nothing was placed in the bow compartment. The backup ropes weighed about 70kg and were placed in the crew cabin. Four barrels of 20-litre lubricant were placed on the right side of the engine room. 20 litres of hydraulic oil were located in the cabinet under the ladder and the diesel oil was at the vessel's rear end. The entrance between the steering gear compartment and the wall of the oil cabinet compartment (deletion) has been there since I worked on "Lamma IV". (I) do not know whether it has been altered.

I do not need to add (anything).

These notes of interview consist of 5 pages. The above information is given voluntarily by me. I signed the notes after reading them through once and confirmed they are correct and do not require further amendments.

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